The Hidden Internet of Iran: Private Address Allocations on a National
  Network by Anderson, Collin
The Hidden Internet of Iran
Private Address Allocations on a National Network
Collin Anderson?
collin@averysmallbird.com
Abstract. While funding agencies have provided substantial support
for the developers and vendors of services that facilitate the unfettered
flow of information through the Internet, little consolidated knowledge
exists on the basic communications network infrastructure of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. In the absence open access and public data, rumors and
fear have reigned supreme. During provisional research on the country’s
censorship regime, we found initial indicators that telecommunications
entities in Iran allowed private addresses to route domestically, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, creating a hidden network only reachable
within the country. Moreover, records such as DNS entries lend evidence
of a ‘dual stack’ approach, wherein servers are assigned a domestic IP
addresses, in addition to a global one. Despite the clear political im-
plications of the claim we put forward, particularly in light of rampant
speculation regarding the mandate of Article 46 of the ‘Fifth Five Year
Development Plan’ to establish a “national information network,” we re-
frain from hypothesizing the purpose of this structure. In order to solicit
critical feedback for future research, we outline our initial findings and
attempt to demonstrate that the matter under contention is a nation-
wide phenomenom that warrants broader attention.
Keywords: censorship, national internet, Iran, rfc1918
1 Introduction
The primary purpose of this paper is to document that Iran has broken from
commonplace Internet addressing standards to create a private network that is
only accessible within the country. We attempt to establish that this private
network is accessible to a wide section of the nation’s Internet users and then
begin to outline our initial findings in order to provoke broader discussion and
solicit feedback on our claim. This publication should be considered a preface to a
broader study on the nature of Iran’s information communications infrastucture
and censorship regime and, as such, where possible we will defer larger questions
on such topics until a future occassion. Furthermore, to the extent possible,
we focus our assessment on that which is qualitatively measurable, and limit
? This project received partial funding from the Center for Global Communication
Studies at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communcation.
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2 Collin Anderson
attempts to augur the political aspects of the matters at hand. This paper is not
intended to be comphrensive, and we err on the site of brevity where possible.
Toward these ends, our contributions are threefold:
1. We establish that there is a coordinated decision by a subset of Iranian
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and government agencies to adopt the use
of private Internet Protocol (IP) addresses across networks.
2. We begin to identify the participants in this arrangement and map logical
neighborhoods within the private space.
3. We attempt to enumerate the services and resources that are available on
this hidden network.
The majority of the experiments outlined are motivated toward collecting
initial, open-ended data on an unexpected phenomenon; where possible our re-
sults are publicly available for outside investigation at: http://github.com/
collina/Filternet
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3, we describe
a ‘kitchen sink’ approach used to extract information from a variety of sources
on the nature of the network. Fundamental principles of network addressing
standards are briefly discussed in Section 2; they are then applied to the case
of Iran in Section 4. Section 4.1 attempts to demonstrate that the reachability
of networks is not a localized phenomenom and presents evidence that these
qualities are the product of intentional design. Data collection methods used to
described the content on the network are discussed in Section 5. Finally, the
paper is concluded in Section 6 with an enumeration of unresolved questions.
1.1 Note About Rhetoric
The claims of this paper are contemporanous to widespread fears regarding the
future of Iran’s Internet, particularly whether the government will shift from
a strategy of aggressive filtering to blocking all access to foreign sites. We can
factually state that the ‘Fifth Five Year Development Plan of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran (2010-2015)’[1] mandates the development of a ‘national information
network’ for the purposes “e-government services, industry, information technol-
ogy, information literacy, and increased productivity in the areas of economic,
social and cultural activities.” The development plan continues on to describe
the need for secure and private communications between government ministries,
businesses and the public, based on increased access to broadband connectivity
and investments in national data centers.
After the codification of the development plan, Reza Taghipour, head of the
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, and other govern-
ment officals began a public campaign extoling the virtues of a national Inter-
net, promising domestic alternatives for email and search, while warning of the
dangers of foreign services.
“a genuinely halal network, aimed at Muslims on an ethical and moral
level” - Ali Agha-Mohammadi, Deputy Vice President for Economic Af-
fairs [10]
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“A national internet can be very effective to protect the country’s infor-
mation and the people’s security.” - Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, Chief
of Law Enforcement Forces [6]
While a substantial portion of the narrative in the Western press and Persian
blogs was based on worst-case scenarios and hoaxes, the parallels between official
comments and the presence of a private, domestic network are stark. However,
upon subsequent investigation, we found reports of the national use of private
addresses as far back as January 2010. At that time the Statistical Center of Iran
had requested the public to report information such as income and property value
via the site ‘amar.org.ir.’ It was reported[8,2] then that the domain resolved
to the IP address 10.10.33.40 and that the site self-reported 2 million visits.1
Additionally, the most visited Iranian site, the filtering page returned within the
country at 10.10.34.34, was mentioned as early as June 24 2010.2 Therefore, we
assert neither that the matters described herein are new, nor that they indicate
immediate plans to disconnect from the global Internet.
2 Standards on Private Internet Addressing
The fundamental basis of network communications is the unique assignment of
IP addresses grouped together within logical subdivisions, refered to as subnets,
to hosts within the network. Globally, the uniqueness property of network num-
bers, such IP addresses or Autonomous Systems numbers (ASN), necessitates
a central authority for allocation and coordination to prevent conflicts. These
responsibilities are delegated to a private governing body, the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) and its regional representatives, from which ISPs
and other entities obtain blocks of addresses.
However, since the potential address space of a 32-bit IP scheme is finite and
not every host requires direct bidirectional accessibility on the Internet, IANA
has reserved three blocks of IP addresses that may be used for private, local
networks without requiring coordination or approval. In the standards document
outlining the use of these private address[9], Rekhter, et al differentiates private
and public hosts thusly:
– Private Hosts Hosts that do not require direct reachability within the global
Internet; or only require a limited set of outside services, which can be han-
dled by intermediary gateways. Private hosts then may maintain IP ad-
dresses that are unambiguous within networks, but ambiguous to the broader
Internet.
1 At the time of writing, a DNS query to Google’s Public DNS returns the address
217.218.11.61 for amar.org.ir and not host appears to be attached to 10.10.33.40.
2 It is noteworthy that at least one blog stated in September 2011 that a number of
unnamed VPN clients were found to connect to 10/8 addresses. While the claim
put forward is not subtantiated by evidence, the ownership and end destination of
popular VPN networks is a matter worth investigation.
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– Public Hosts Hosts that require access outside the enterprise and maintain
an IP addresses that is globally unambiguous and logically reachable.[9, p.g.
3,4]
Figure 1 lists the established set of deregulated, reusable blocks of IPs, allo-
cated to help conserve the finite pool of global addresses and make it easier to
establish smaller, localized networks of hosts.
10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255 (16 ,777 ,216 Addresses)
172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255 (1 ,048 ,576 Addresses)
192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255 (65 ,536 Addresses)
Fig. 1: IANA Reserved Private Address Blocks
Those hosts assigned IP addresses within a private address block may com-
municate within the same network, however, they may not directly exchange
traffic with the broader Internet. RFC1918 makes explicitly clear the expecta-
tions vis-a`-vis routing traffic from hosts with private addresses.
Because private addresses have no global meaning, routing information
about private networks shall not be propagated on inter-enterprise links,
and packets with private source or destination addresses should not be
forwarded across such links. Routers in networks not using private ad-
dress space, especially those of Internet service providers, are expected
to be configured to reject (filter out) routing information about private
networks. If such a router receives such information the rejection shall
not be treated as a routing protocol error.[9, p.g. 5]
Traditional networks utilize the mechanism of ‘network address translation’
(NAT) to allow globally-accessible intermediaries to act as gateways, transpar-
ently sending and receiving traffic to the broader Internet on behalf of private
hosts within the same network. As the number of directly connected Internet de-
vices has increased, the pool of unallocated IP addresses available for networks
has diminished; many ISPs have employed techniques such as ‘Carrier-Grade
NAT’ (CGN) or ‘Large-Scale NAT’ in order to stretch allotments. Similar to
NAT within an enterprise, in a CGN network, a localized set of users share a
single public address, while each user is assigned a private address internal to
the network. These addressing schemes have also been leveraged to limit the
availability of exclusive content, such as Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), to
consumers and decrease the exposure of infrastructure to outside actors.
3 Experimental Setup
Before describing our findings, it is necessary to address various ethical aspects
of our research and then outline the methods with which we were able to conduct
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our analysis. Lastly, we close this section by noting some of the shortcomings of
this approach and addressing how we attempted to mitigate potential problems.
3.1 Legal and Ethical Aspects
During the process of preparing and running our experiments, we took spe-
cial care to not knowingly violate any laws or, considering the diminishing op-
portunities for international collaboration or free expression, expose individuals
within Iran to potential harm. In addition, all our experiments were in accor-
dance with any pertinent terms of service and within reasonable considerations
of network usage, taking care to not engage in behavior that would be con-
sidered intrusive. Within a literature review of computer science research, we
found that widescale surveying of accessible networks has become an accepted
manner of collecting data on aggregate qualities of the Internet or communica-
tions infrastructure[5,7,4]. In line with other works, our data collection is limited
to the normal, expected functions of remote system that are reachable without
requiring credentials.
3.2 Points of Observation
To ensure that our findings are not a localized phenomenom, we have sought to
obtain a heterogenous set of vantage points on different logical segments of Iran’s
communications infrastructure for the purposes of measurement and observation.
Host 1, Tehran: The bulk of our initial experimentation was conducted
from a host in Tehran, Iran that falls under a significant provider, who services
state agencies such as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. While outside
the scope of this paper, Host 1’s primary upstream peer is Russian Rostelecom
(AS12389) through the Information Technology Company (AS12880).
Host 2, Tehran: Secondary testing was performed from a network that
provides upstream access for several universities, the Ministry of Commerce and
research institutions affiliated with the Ministry of Science, Research, and Tech-
nology. The primary upstream provider for Host 2 is Delta Telecom (AS29049)
through the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (AS6736).
Open HTTP Proxies: In order to test as wide of a subset of Iran’s networks
as possible, we enumerated a pool of openly accessible HTTP proxies, on both
public and private addresses, and made requests to a mixed set of public and
private hosts through them. For our limited purposes, we assumed that if the
proxy was able to successfully relay requests, some level of connectivity existed
between the intermediary and the destination. After scanning publicly-accessible
Iranian IP blocks for servers listening on the port used by the Squid web cache
service, around a hundred proxies were identified on 27 networks.3 The same
process repeated on private address space yielded 15 proxies on indeterminate
networks.
3 We use ASN as a stand-in for grouping networks, recognizing that this creates in-
congruenties in reporting, since some resources report these details with differing
granularity.
6 Collin Anderson
3.3 Shortcomings
There are natural limitations imposed on research from a small subset of the
hosts with a country, particularly where limited outside information exists. Fur-
thermore, we should recognize that we have no reliable information about the
owners of our points of observations, such as whether they conduct localized
network filtering that differs from other locations with regard to the type, tech-
nologies or sophistication. Active analysis of a censorship systems and networks
can easily attract attention if no special care is taken. Considering the history
of attacks against the public’s ability to safely access the global Internet, the
ability to coordinate real time sources of data is a vital resource that we have
sought to be protect for future use.
We acknowledge the aforementioned shortcomings of our experimental meth-
ods, and have stratified our sourcing while attempting to be conservative in our
claims.
4 Analysis
traceroute to facebook.com (69.63.181.12)
...Home Network...
2 91.99.***.***.parsonline.net [91.99.***.***]
3 10.220.1.2
4 2.180.2.1
5 217.219.64.115
6 78.38.245.6
7 78.38.245.5
8 78.38.244.242
9 78.38.244.241
10 10.10.53.61
...Traffic Exits Country...
Fig. 2: Traceroute to Public Internet
traceroute to 10.10.34.34 (10.10.34.34)
...Home Network...
2 81.12.48.89 (81.12.48.89)
3 10.9.27.1 (10.9.27.1)
4 10.30.153.253 (10.30.153.253)
5 217.218.190.26 (217.218.190.26)
6 78.38.119.30 (78.38.119.30)
7 78.38.119.210 (78.38.119.210)
8 195.146.33.29 (195.146.33.29)
9 10.10.34.34 (10.10.34.34)
Fig. 3: Traceroute to Content Filter
The most immediate indicators of the
national use of private addresses in
Iran lie within the filtering regime
and international routing paths. Iran
maintains one of the most aggressive
filtering regimes in the world, blocking
access to a wide range of content, de-
termined to offend the political order,
religious morality or social norms. At-
tempts to visit restricted content re-
sults in redirection to a site offering
suggestions for state-sanctioned con-
tent. While the user appears to re-
main on the site they attempted to
visit, the redirection is made within
a frame to the private IP address
10.10.34.34 (See Figure 4, the results
of a request for Facebook.com). 4
This censorship mechanism is in
part a product of the centralization
of Iran’s network around the Telecom-
munication Company of Iran (TCI). All internationally-bound traffic is routed
through either a subsidary of the TCI, the Information Technology Company of
4 We defer elaboration on the mechanism until our broader discussion of Iran’s filtering
regime, however is it worth noting that there appears to be two observable differences
in responses, based on the filter rule triggered (‘Invalid Site’/‘Invalid Pattern’) and
based on location (‘F1-IPM’/‘M3-5’)
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Iran (AS12880), or the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathe-
matics (AS6736). For the majority of consumer networks, which connect through
TCI, the final hop before traffic exits the country appears to be handled by one
of at least three Huawei Quidway NetEngine80E core routers that have private
network addresses within the 10.10.53.0/24 range (See Figure ??).
<html ><head ><meta http -equiv="Content -Type" content ="text/html; charset=
windows -1256"><title >F1 -IPM </title ></head ><body ><iframe src=http ://10.10.34.34?
type=Invalid Site&policy=MainPolicy " style="width: 100%; height: 100%"
scrolling ="no" marginwidth ="0" marginheight ="0" frameborder ="0" vspace
="0" hspace ="0"></iframe ></body ></html >
Fig. 4: Response to Filtered GET Request
Service (Port) Number of Host
FTP (21) 12672
SSH (22) 8029
Telnet (23) 20060
SMTP (25) 183
DNS (53) 2510
POP (110) 78
HTTP (80) 9960
IMAP (143) 44
HTTPS (443) 1366
HTTP-Alt (8080) 601
Fig. 5: Services on Private IP Space
While it is within standard expec-
tations for a network infrastructure
to use private addresses internally for
reasons of security, flexibility and re-
source limits, under RFC1918, hosts
should not be reachable from outside
the immediate network by these pri-
vate addresses. In order to measure
the extent that this private network
space is used by the TCI and oth-
ers, we attempted to make connec-
tions to all 16,777,216 possible ad-
dresses within the IP block 10.0.0.0/8.
We performed our data collection
in three phases: discovering IP ad-
dresses accepting connections on TCP port 23 (Telnet), 53 (DNS) or 80 (HTTP);
performing a simple handshake and storing the presented response; and mapping
routers to determine logical grouping and routes. Based on the pool of potential
networks we narrowed this range to 45928 potential hosts.
4.1 Measuring Reachability to the Private Network
As acknowleged in Section 3, we are naturally limited in the extent to which
we can assert that our findings are valid for the entirity of the country’s domes-
tically routable networks. Even according the public statements made by the
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, the implementation
of the mandates of Article 46 is incomplete and is being progressively deployed,
prioritizing academic institutions and government ministries. Therefore, we do
not expect access to be universal or consistent across all geographic regions or
networks.
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Using our established pool of open, globally-accessible proxies, we attempted
to make proxied HTTP GET requests to: (i) a globally available website lo-
cated inside of the country, (ii) a domain pointing to a private IP address, and
(iii) a private IP address running a webservice, (iv) an a unfiltered global web-
site located outside of the country, as a control to ensure the proxy is properly
working. 5 If any of these requests returned a “200 OK,” the standard response
for successful HTTP requests, and matched our the expected page title, then
the end destination was counted as reachable. In parallel, this experiment was
repeated with our set of proxies with private addresses. Using this process, we
could verify that 27 distinct networks, and 12 hosts with private addresses, were
able to reach at least one of our private space hosts. Relying on proxy servers to
measure connectivity to private networks is subject to a number of hypotheti-
cal scenarios under which misconfiguration on the part of the administrator, or
limitations on intended use, may trigger a false negative. A false positive is pos-
sible, however, the foreseeable circumstances under which this may occur, since
we match the integrity of the response data against expected results, seem less
probable. Thus, we focus on successful connections as a measure of connectivity
and do not give failures much weight.
The results of this measurement are enumerated in Listing 9. Of the publicly
accessible networks, 24 (89%) had at least one host that was able to connect to
Iran.ir’s private IP address and 21 (77%) were able to connect to the Imam Reza
International University. For internal proxies, 13 were able to connect to Iran.ir
and 6 could reach the university.6
5 How Widely Used is the Private Network
Unlike the global Internet[3], no public registry of the networks attached to this
private address space exists. Therefore, we sought to leverage a mixed methods
approach of mining open sources to begin a very preliminary mapping of the
hidden Internet. Through data collection methods, such as collecting service
banners and tracing the path of traffic, we were able to learn the public identities
of hosts within the private address, describing the: (i) logical neighborhoods of
networks, (ii) purposeful utilization of private networking spaces, and (iii) wide
coordination of network infrastructure. A significant number of these responses
included a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) and public addresses that could
be matched against public records. Using this methodology, we begin to build
a rudimentary understanding of the logical ownership and participation in the
national network, which is compiled together in Figures 7 and 8.
5.1 Service Banners
5 In order: peyvandha.ir, ou.imamreza.ac.ir, 10.8.12.18 (what we suspect is the pri-
vate address of the national email service), google.com (which during testing was
unfiltered)
6 Successfully reaching ‘ou.imamreza.ac.ir’ is a more difficult task as it required the
proxy to successful resolve a domain against an available nameserver.
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$ nc 10.143.177.18 25
220 webmail.isfidc.com ESMTP MailEnable...
$ dig +short webmail.isfidc.com
91.222.196.18
Fig. 6: Banner Grabbing on SMTP
During the enumeration of hosts out-
lined under Section 4, we sought
to identify Internet information ser-
vices responding within private net-
work spaces, particularly web, email
and domain servers. After identifying
which of a possible 16,777,216 IP addresses were populated with hosts, we then
were able to conduct the secondary retrieval of data and attempt to assess the
amount of web content with the private address space.
Considering the scale of such a search, determination that a particular ser-
vice was available was based on a simple acknowledgement by the remote host
that some application was listening on the port commonly associated with it.7
Depending on the type of web service, a number of variables could skew the
degree to which our results match the effective reality. For example, many home
DSL routers will allow device configuration through a web or telnet frontend,
which would be difficult to differentiate from a complete Internet site. Moreover,
companies commonly host multiple websites on a single server; a simple connec-
tion would not divulge the amount of content available.8 Bearing in mind these
caveats, Figure 5 details the results of this search.
As noted, while ownership of IP segments is public record, no such resource
is available for unregulated, private addresses. Whether or not such a scan is
an accurate representation of the richness of this environment, it does facilitate
the exploration of the ownership of its logical subdivisions by linking the con-
tent hosted on networks with particular organizations or public network blocks.
As demonstrated in Figure ??), many services divulge what they believe to be
their identities by simply connecting to them. Information such as a FQDN can
be linked to a publicly available IP address; this link could then be validated
by matching secondary information such as timestamps and software versions.
After ensuring that 10.143.177.18 and ‘91.222.196.18’ are most likely the same
server, we can reasonably assume that some subnet that contains the address
10.143.177.18 belongs to the ‘Computer Research Center of Islamic Seminary
of Isfahan.’9 Even where information retrieved is incomplete, context regarding
location or content narrows the possibilities for further investigation, such as
matching the content of the responses of private webservers with sites that have
public components crawled by a search engine. We might also find indicators in
determining where the majority of links within returned sites lead.
5.2 DNS Records
A particularly striking aspect of our findings is the occurrence of domains that
maintain DNS records for valid, reachable private IP addresses, or multiple
7 We recorded a host as interesting based on it responding to a TCP SYN request.
8 The occurrence of server names such as ‘Sepehr Server Farm’ on the network
10.30.74.0/24 lend evidence of shared hosting servers on private space.
9 The Research Center is assigned the IP Block 91.222.196.0/22 attached to AS48121.
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records that include both public and private pointers. Evaluation of all pos-
sible DNS records is difficult since IRNIC, the maintainer of the Iranian country
top level domain .ir, does not appear to release the zone file that would list
registered domains. We are therefore limited to examining public resources and
service banners to build Figure 8.
5.3 NAT Traversal and ICMP Deflection
To communcate bidirectionally access the Internet machines assigned private
address will either have to have an additional, public address or be able to
transit through a NAT gateway. Since we are interested greatly in international
accessibility, as well as correlating private with public addresses, but unable to
directly query private space hosts, we attempt to make an ICMP Echo request
from within the country to a private address, forging the source address as our
server outside of the country. The destination should issue an ICMP Echo-Reply
to the external host. If the response travels through a gateway along its route,
the private address of the remote host will be rewritten with the public address
of the intermediary, lending evidence to network ownership.
ICMP Echo requests were sent to all remote hosts previously identified, using
the sequence data field to correlate the private address queried with the response
seen. There are a number of reasons why a host would not reply, including firewall
policies or changes in reachability since the scan. Out of the 45,928 hosts queried,
our external observer recieved 10,344 responses, of which 358 had a public source
address. Another 408 replied with a different private address than that queried,
which may be due to reasons such as the response being from an intermediary
along the route or the remote host having multiple addresses attached. The
remainder of replies maintained the private address that was queried. The vast
majority of public addresses seen resolved to the networks of TCI’s Information
Technology Company, with the remaining from AsiaTech Inc. (2 hosts), Soroush
Rasanheh Company Ltd (8 Hosts), CallWithMe (1), Neda Rayaneh (6). 10
5.4 Traceroute Data
Tracing the route of network traffic is trival and lends evidences as to the par-
ticipation in the private addressing scheme. Using the example of the filtered
site page (10.10.34.34), Figure ?? shows the route that a request takes to ar-
rive at its destination. We note that the IP address immediately preceding the
final destination (195.146.33.29) is publicly registered to ‘Data Communication
Affairs,’ a subdivision of the Information Technology Company. Since network
traffic will route to the datacenter in which the host is located before reaching
the end destination, we may infere that Data Communication Affairs has a role
in the maintenance of the filtering apparatus.
10 There were two abnormalities, likely the result of network addressing errors by ad-
ministrators, where public addresses appeared to originate from France Telecom and
AT&T Services, Inc.
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We can apply this same theory to other discrete destinations of the network,
by tracing the routes taken to every possible IP address beginning with 10. and
ending in .1, under the assumption that they represent the smallest reasonable
division of the private address space. Using our in-country hosts, we are able to
create the path maps in Figures 12 and 13. We extend this work by extracting
the unique public addresses found in routing and determining their ownership
in Figure 10. 11
IP Address Host/Network
10.8.12.18 Iran.ir National Webmail Service
10.8.218.0/24 Pishgaman, ADSL Internet Service Provider
10.10.34.34 Data Communication Affairs’s Filtered Site Page
10.10.36.0/24 Telecommunications Company of Iran
10.30.54.0/24 Parsonline, ADSL Internet Service Provider
10.254.50.0/24 Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
10.9.28.0/24 Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
10.143.218.199 Telecommunications Company of Isfahan
10.56.59.198 Khorasgan Islamic Azad University, Isfahan
10.7.234.0/24 Ministry of Agriculture
10.30.170.0/24 Ministry Of Education
10.21.243.37 National Internet Development Agency of Iran
Fig. 7: Sampled Identifiable Networks and Sites on Private IP Space
6 Conclusions and Further Questions
We have sought to shed light and collect data on a previously unexplored and
unorthodox aspect of Iran’s information communication infrastructure, then of-
fered evidence that the network design described is the product of purposeful
design. Through comparative analyses from a diversity of sources, we have lent
evidence to the premise that the national Internet is internally consistent and
widely reachable. In addition, while we do not attempt to augur the future of the
country’s international connectivity, we have offered conjecture that Internet of
the Islamic Republic has an increasingly autonomous property at its core. In this
capacity, the private space networks we have encountered is consistent with the
expectation put forward by the Ministry of Information and Communications
11 Again, we have removed four instances where networks associated with AOL Transit
Data Network (1668) and AT&T Services, Inc. (AS7018) were found likely due to
administrators miscalculating the private 172.16.0.0/12 subnet.
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Technology. However, we have only dredged up more questions than answers;
moving forward, we see an immediate need to answer the following questions:
Are Private Addressing Schemes Related to IPv4 Exhaustion? Based on
RIPE delegated address data retrieved September 18 2012, networks regis-
tered in Iran have approximately a total of 9,555,968 IPv4 addresses allo-
cated. While based on the number of Internet-connected homes, it is difficult
to imagine Iran nearing the point of exhaustion.12 Considering the multitude
of consumer devices with data capacity, it remains difficult to assess the over-
all necessity of CGN-type solutions. However, the scenario outlined herein
differs significant from the typical CGN scenario in that routes are shared
outside of local networks. Furthermore, CGN is generally employed to mit-
igate the impact of residential or mobile Internet connectivity, rather than
government ministries, universities or content hosts.
Does the Private Network have Global Internet Access? In Section 5.3,
we attempted to test the public accessibility of the private space hosts by
forging ICMP echo requests to hosts outside of the country. Additionally,
similar to the setup used in Section 3.2, we tested the reach of proxies lis-
tening on private addresses. In both cases, it did appear that a minority of
systems queried were able to communicate through either NAT gateways or
additional public address attached to the host.
Will Iran Segment the National Network from International Traffic
Using DNS? As we have demonstrated, Iranian organizations have used the
domain system to implement national Internet sites with a degree of opacity
to the user. Moreover, in some cases auxiliary records exist to allow web-
sites to failover from public to private networks. The logical next step for
telecommunications entities would be to implement DNS tampering or ‘split-
horizon’ mechanisms to provide different DNS responses, based on whether
the query originates in Iran or internationally. In preliminary testing, we
have found little evidence that Iran has attempted to interfere with DNS ser-
vices; instead, filtering of services such as HTTP appears to be done through
transparent proxying and other forms of traffic interception. In the process
of investigating content hosted on the private network, we found a number
of FQDNs that were unresponsive to requests and did not resolve by DNS
to an IP. Later we found that a selection of these domains would only prop-
erly resolve against an Iranian DNS, such as the public service of IRNIC, as
demonstrated in Figure 11. Revisiting this matter within a limited subset of
domains revealed ‘blizz.ir’ is not the only instance of this phenomenom, with
further examples found in the ‘isftak.ir’ and ‘geeges.co.ir’ domains. Whether
intentionally or unintentionally, the use of private addresses for DNS name-
12 Wide differences exist in the estimation of home Internet users, ranging from
43% (Broadcasting Board of Governors) to 21% (International Telecommunication
Union, Iranian Statistics Center)[11]; on September 4 2012, the consumer ADSL
and WiMAX ISP ‘Gostaresh-e-Ertbata-e Mabna’ was awarded one of the last large
unallocated blocks of IP addresses remaining.
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servers has the strong potential to interfere with normal Internet functions
by impeding the global proliferation of route information.
Is the Private Address Space Growing? The data captured by the project
represents a narrow window of observation in late August and early Septem-
ber 2012; we therefore lack a proper perspective on the extent or rate to which
this address space is expanding or contracting. We have noted in Section 1.1
that the private address space has been in use since 2010. Scanning such a
large address block is a significant endeavour and may attract unnecessary
attention; therefore, we propose to continue to monitor the routes to the
smallest reasonable class C networks, and reserve wider scans to infrequent
occassions.
How Much Content is Located Exclusively on the Private Network?
We have attempted to establish that a wide range of public services are du-
plicated on the private network, or exist solely for internal users. This has
been a case based on time-consuming investigation of hints returned from
hosts and in no way represents a thorough evaluation of the state of the
national network. An opportunity track similar to monitoring address use is
in order and will be pursued.
Are Users Given Private Addresses? In Figure ??, it appears that the most
immediate next hop for a Parsonline user, which would generally be a DSLAM,
is a private space address. However, it is unclear whether the address re-
ported to be associated with the host is the product of CGN, or a directly
assigned public address. Testing was not performed from residential connec-
tions, so it remains unclear whether any ISPs utilize private addresses for
hosts. During analysis of content, we did determine informally that the ma-
jority of responses on HTTP services where from ADSL modems, which may
indicate that some home users at least have a dual set of private and public
addresses.
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lib.atu.ac.ir 10.24.96.14 Allameh Tabatabaie University
www.mdhc.ir 10.30.5.163 Vice Presidency for Management Development
and Human Capital
www.iranmardom.ir 10.30.5.148 Vice Presidency for Management Development
and Human Capital
erp.msrt.ir 10.30.55.29 Ministry of Science, Research and Technology
ou.imamreza.ac.ir 10.56.51.27 Imam Reza University
www.tehranedu.ir 10.30.95.7 Tehran Education Organization
sanaad.ir 10.30.170.142 Private Individual
ww3.isaco.ir 10.21.201.50 Iran Khodro Spare Parts & After-sales Services
Company
iiees.ac.ir 192.168.8.9 International Institute of Earthquake Engineering
and Seismology
169.254.78.139
194.227.17.14
10.10.3.2
tci-khorasan.ir 217.219.65.5 Telecommunication Company of Iran, Khorasan
10.1.2.0
adsl.yazdtelecom.ir 10.144.0.14 Telecommunications Company of Iran, Yazd
iranhrc.ir 46.36.117.51 Private Individual
10.30.74.3
acc4.pishgaman.net 81.12.49.108 Pishgaman, ADSL Access Provider
10.8.218.4
lib.uma.ac.ir 10.116.2.5 University of Mohaghegh Ardabili
film.medu.ir 10.30.170.110 Ministry Of Education
www.shirazedc.co.ir 10.175.28.172 Shiraz Electric Distribution Company
Fig. 8: Domains, Corresponding A Records and Ownership For Private Addresses
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ASN (Hosts) 10.8.12.18 google.com ou.imamreza.ac.ir peyvandha.ir
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
RFC1918 (15) 13 9 6 12
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
44285 (2) 0 2 0 0
31549 (3) 0 0 1 0
50810 (2) 1 0 1 0
39501 (1) 1 1 1 1
48159 (4) 1 3 1 3
50892 (1) 1 1 1 1
42163 (2) 1 1 2 1
51235 (1) 1 1 1 1
16322 (5) 5 3 3 3
25184 (1) 1 1 1 1
42586 (3) 3 3 3 3
48575 (4) 4 4 1 4
48431 (1) 1 1 0 1
48555 (1) 0 1 0 1
44208 (2) 2 2 2 2
12880 (27) 18 6 7 6
48944 (13) 12 0 0 0
57357 (1) 1 1 0 1
59442 (1) 1 1 1 1
48289 (1) 1 1 1 1
25124 (2) 1 1 1 1
43754 (2) 2 2 1 2
47796 (1) 1 1 1 1
41900 (1) 1 1 1 1
12660 (1) 1 0 0 0
44375 (1) 0 0 1 0
8571 (1) 1 0 0 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fig. 9: Destination Accessibility For Accessible Networks
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Network Addresses
ASK-AS Andishe Sabz Khazar Autonomous System (39308) 7
NGSAS Neda Gostar Saba Data Transfer Company Private Joint
(39501)
4
TIC-AS Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (48159) 9
IR-PARSUN Parsun Network Solutions, IR (31732) 1
IR-AVABARID-AS Rasaneh Avabarid Private Joint Stock Company
(51431)
1
AZADNET Azadnet Autonomous System (24631) 1
TEBYAN Tebyan-e-Noor Cultural-Artistic Institute (48434) 3
PAYAMAVARAN-KAVIR Shabakeh Gostar Payamavaran Kavir Com-
pany (Private Joint Stock) (57454)
1
PARSONLINE PARSONLINE Autonomous System (16322) 1
SINET-AS Soroush Rasanheh Company Ltd (21341) 6
FARAHOOSH Farahoosh Dena (44208) 1
DCI-AS Information Technology Company (ITC) (12880) 403
ASKHALIJFARSONLINE Khalij Ettela Resan Jonoub LTD (48944) 1
NEDA-AS neda rayaneh (30902) 1
IR-PISHGAMAN-ICP Pishgaman Kavir Yazd (34918) 2
HAMARA-AS Hamara System Tabriz Engineering Company (47262) 3
ASIATECH-AS AsiaTech Inc. (43754) 3
AFRANET AFRANET Co. Tehran, Iran (25184) 1
OFOGHNET-AS Mortabet Rayaneh Ofogh (29020) 1
FANAVA-AS Fanava Group (41881) 8
Fig. 10: Identifiable Networks and Sites in Private IP Space Routes
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$ dig realm.blizz.ir
; <<>> DiG 9.3.6-P1-RedHat -9.3.6 -20. P1.el5_8.2 <<>> realm.blizz.ir
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER <<- opcode: QUERY , status: REFUSED , id: 4166
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;realm.blizz.ir. IN A
;; Query time: 213 msec
;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8)
;; WHEN: Tue Sep 18 06:55:27 2012
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 32
---
$ dig realm.blizz.ir @a.irnic.ir
; <<>> DiG 9.3.6-P1-RedHat -9.3.6 -20. P1.el5_8.2 <<>> realm.blizz.ir @a.irnic.ir
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER <<- opcode: QUERY , status: NOERROR , id: 8249
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;realm.blizz.ir. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
realm.blizz.ir. 3600 IN A 10.175.27.120
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
blizz.ir. 14400 IN NS ns1.blizz.ir.
blizz.ir. 14400 IN NS ns2.blizz.ir.
;; Query time: 32 msec
;; SERVER: 194.225.70.89#53(194.225.70.89)
;; WHEN: Tue Sep 18 06:55:16 2012
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 84
Fig. 11: Failure to Propagate DNS Records
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Fig. 12: Traceroute Pathes From Host 1
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Fig. 13: Traceroute Pathes From Host 2
